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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 10-cr-00237-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable William H. Walls 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 24, 2012 
_______________ 
 
Before:  FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges and JONES*
 
, District Judge. 






                                                 
* District Court Judge John E. Jones sitting by designation. 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Appellant Roberto Castanon (“Castanon”) appeals the District Court’s November 
22, 2010 judgment sentencing him to a term of thirty-seven months of imprisonment and 
three years of supervised release.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment and sentence. 
I.     BACKGROUND 
We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and shall recount only the 
essential facts.  From January 2003 to February 2007, Castanon and numerous defendants 
conspired to defraud insurers by staging automobile accidents.  Castanon and his co-
defendants would stage the collisions and then report the accidents to the police.  The 
purportedly injured person would seek medical attention at various chiropractic facilities, 
including Spinal Care and Rehabilitation and Perth Amboy Diagnostics.  Castanon was 
the president and owner of Spinal Care and Rehabilitation.  The co-defendants would 
then submit false invoices and other documents related to medical and chiropractic claims 
to various automobile insurance companies. 
On April 6, 2010, Castanon pled guilty to count one of the information, charging 
him with conspiracy to commit mail fraud, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1349.  Castanon 
acknowledged that the loss attributable to the insurance companies was in excess of 
$400,000.  The District Court held a sentencing hearing on November 22, 2010 and 
determined that Castanon’s total offense level was twenty-one, with a criminal history 
category I.  Castanon’s counsel then requested a downward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 
 
 3 
3553(a), arguing that it should be granted because of Castanon’s extraordinary family 
circumstances.2
In addition, Castanon’s counsel requested a variance to facilitate the payment of 
restitution to the victims, based on the contention that the custodial term suggested by the 




The government argued for a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range, citing 
to Castanon’s role, the offense conduct, the seriousness of the offense, and the sentences 
of the other defendants.   
   
The District Court evaluated the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and concluded that 
Castanon’s family circumstances did not remove his case from the heartland of similarly 
situated criminal cases, hence a variance was not warranted.  The District Court imposed 
a sentence of thirty-seven months, with three years of supervised release. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
                                                 
2 Castanon was 63 years old, and served as the caretaker for his wife who was suffering 
from a recurrence of breast cancer.  Castanon reportedly provided physical, emotional 
and financial support for his wife. 




A district court’s sentencing procedure is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007).  On abuse of discretion review, the court of 
appeals gives due deference to a district court’s sentencing decision.  Id. at 51.   
Our appellate review proceeds in two stages.  It begins by ensuring that the 
district court committed no significant procedural error, such as (1) failing 
to calculate (or improperly calculating) the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
range; (2) treating the Guidelines as mandatory; (3) failing to consider the 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; or (4) selecting a sentence based on clearly 
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence and to 
include an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.  If the 
district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.      
 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 
At stage two, we consider a sentence’s substantive reasonableness.  Our 
substantive review requires us not to focus on one or two factors, but on the totality of the 
circumstances.  At both stages of our review, the party challenging the sentence has the 
burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.  Id. at 567 (internal quotations marks, 
brackets, and citations omitted).   
III. ANALYSIS 
 Castanon argues that his sentence of thirty-seven months was substantively 
unreasonable, and was based upon the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines calculation contained 
in the PSR.  Castanon also contends that the District Court failed to consider the 
mitigating 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors before imposing its sentence.4
                                                 
4 Castanon is contending that the District Court committed procedural error in sentencing, 
  Castanon argues 
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that the failure of the District Court to give meaningful weight and consideration to the 
mitigating factors was unreasonable and erroneous as a matter of law, and contrary to the 
holding in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, sentencing Guidelines were no 
longer deemed mandatory.  Instead, they were deemed advisory.  Since Booker, district 
courts are required to follow a three-step process in determining the appropriate sentence 
in this advisory scheme:   
(1) Courts must continue to calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence 
precisely as they would have before Booker.   
(2) In doing so, they must formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties and 
stat[e] on the record whether they are granting a departure and how that 
departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and tak[e] into account [our] 
Circuit’s pre-Booker case law, which continues to have advisory force.  
(3) Finally, they are required to exercise [] [their] discretion by considering 
the relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors, in setting the sentence they impose 
regardless whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the 
Guidelines. 
 
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).   
Sentencing judges are statutorily required to state their reasons for imposing a 
sentence, although a comprehensive, detailed opinion is not required.  Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).  The judge must provide an explanation that is 
                                                                                                                                                             
although he does not actually articulate the argument in the brief.  He also contends that 
the sentence was substantively unreasonable.  For those reasons, we examine the District 
Court’s sentence for procedural error and substantive unreasonableness. 
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sufficient to satisfy the appellate court that the district court considered the parties’ 
arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own decision-making authority.  Id. 
Procedural Error 
The Probation Office prepared a PSR, in which it claimed that Castanon was 
responsible for $698,321.92 in loss, based on the invoice amounts billed to various 
insurance carriers.  As reported in the PSR, the applicable guideline, § 2B1.1(a)(1), 
carries a base offense level of seven.  Because the loss was more than $400,000 but less 
than $1,000,000, a fourteen level enhancement, pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H), was 
applicable.  In addition, Castanon was found to be a manager or supervisor of the 
criminal conduct, pursuant to § 3B1.1(b), resulting in a three-level enhancement.  The 
adjusted offense level was twenty-four, with a two-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility, pursuant to § 3E1.1(a), and an additional one-level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to §3E1.1(b) (provided that a motion by the 
Government would be granted at sentencing).  The adjusted offense level was calculated 
at twenty-one.  The offense level of twenty-one, along with a criminal history category of 
I, provides an advisory Guidelines range of thirty-seven to forty-six months of 
imprisonment.  Pursuant to § 3583(b)(2), the Court may impose a term of supervised 
release of not more than three years.  Castanon was sentenced to the bottom of the 
advisory Guidelines range at thirty-seven months, with three years of supervised release. 
At the sentencing hearing, Castanon requested a downward variance, based on his 
family obligations and his wife’s illness.  The government requested a sentence within 
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the applicable advisory Guidelines range, emphasizing that Castanon was the leader of 
the criminal enterprise, and supervised his co-defendants.  The government also pointed 
out that in order to prevent any unwarranted sentencing disparities with the co-defendants 
sentenced previously, a sentence within the advisory Guidelines was appropriate. 
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court heard the parties’ arguments and 
Castanon’s testimony.  It then reiterated the facts of the case, and addressed Castanon’s 
argument regarding his unique circumstances.  Although Castanon’s counsel pointed out 
that Castanon was sixty-three years old, the District Court stated “[t]hat he is in his sixties 
is really of no moment because he committed the crime while he was in his late fifties 
and he knew what he was doing.  His acts were [sic] not that of a young person who was 
acting out of immaturity or impulse.  He knew exactly what he was doing.”  Appendix, 
Vol. II, A41.  Next, the District Court discussed and sympathized with the fact that 
Castanon’s wife was seriously ill, but pointed out that the wife receives the care and 
support of her adult daughters.  Given that his wife is cared for, Castanon’s situation did 
not “fall outside of what can be expected of within the mainstream of human events, 
particularly since she has the available services of her mature children.”  Id. at Vol. II, 
A42.   
The District Court then explained the purpose of sentencing, which is to “provide 
suitable punishment for the nature of the crime, to provide possible avenues for 
rehabilitation, and to do all of this consistent with the needs of society and the interest of 
overall justice, taking into account the previous history of the person.”  Id. at A43.  The 
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District Court stated that Castanon needed to be punished for the crime, because he was 
aware of his criminal actions, had engaged in them for three to four years, and had 
actively recruited others to participate in the criminal activities.   
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Castanon’s request 
seeking a downward departure. 
Castanon also argues that the District Court did not properly consider the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense.  
Sentencing courts must give meaningful consideration to all of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).   See United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 546 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United 
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006)).  A district court’s “failure to 
consider the § 3553(a) factors” can create a procedurally unreasonable sentence.  United 
States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.)   
We find that the District Court adequately addressed the § 3553(a) factors.  The 
District Court stated at sentencing, “I have no desire to punish him [Castanon] more than 
what is necessary.  I believe what I am about to do is reasonable, consistent with his own 
previous criminal history, together with his, with the nature of the crime. . .”  Appendix, 
Vol. II, A44.  The District Court commented on the nature and circumstances of the 
offense by stating “[t]he nature of the crime, as I said, was widespread and he netted 
$300,000 by his own admission.  That he invested it in his small business is really of no 
moment as far as to what he did, other than to say that he had no right to do anything with 
the money because he had no right to the money initially.”  Appendix, Vol. II, A43-44.  
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The District Court discussed Castanon’s supervisory role in the crime, and stated that it 
would ensure that the punishment was “consistent with the nature of the crime which 
affected all of society in the context of burdening society with added cost of living, 
particularly of driving by fake claim.”  Id. 
Substantive Unreasonableness 
 Castanon argues that the sentence is substantively unreasonable and is an abuse of 
discretion.  The substantive component of a reasonableness review requires the appellate 
court to take into account the totality of the circumstances.  United States v. Lychock, 
578 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2009).  Although the appellate court considers the extent of 
any variance from the advisory Guidelines range, it must also give due deference to the 
district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the 
variance.  Id.  The substantive reasonableness of each sentence must be evaluated on its 
own terms, based on the reasons that the district court provided, in light of the particular 
facts and circumstances of that case.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 574.  In examining the totality 
of the circumstances, we determine whether any reasonable court could have imposed the 
same sentence as the District Court.  See Lychock, 578 F.3d at 219 n.2.   
During the sentencing hearing, the District Court recounted Castanon’s crimes and 
his particular role as a supervisor in the crime.  The District Court discussed Castanon’s 
circumstances at great length, considered the effect of the crime on the victims, and the 
losses incurred, particularly when making its ruling regarding restitution.  The District 
Court also reviewed and commented on various letters of support on Castanon’s behalf.   
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The District Court considered and discussed the § 3553(a) factors.  The record 
contains numerous indications that the District Court evaluated all of the circumstances 
of this crime and used its discretion in deciding that a downward departure was not 
warranted in this case.  In addition, the District Court considered the possibility of a 
disparity in sentencing, pursuant to 3553(a)(6).  The District Court noted “I certainly see 
no reason that’s been advanced that I would consider meaningful in the context of 
sentencing to give the present ringleader less than what I have given his accomplice 
supporters.”  Appendix, Vol. II, A43.   
The sentence imposed was well within the District Court’s broad discretion and 
we find that a reasonable court could have rendered the same sentence.  We have 
emphasized that sentences falling within the advisory Guidelines range are more likely to 
be reasonable than those falling outside of that range.  See United States v. Olfano, 503 
F.3d 244-45 (3d Cir. 2007).  The sentence imposed here was not substantively 
unreasonable and there is no abuse of discretion.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
  The District Court rendered a sentence that is both procedurally correct and 
substantively reasonable.  We will affirm the judgment of conviction.   
